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RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
Assessment of Equalization Effects of Government Transfers to 
Portuguese Municipalities Using Panel Data Methodologies 
 
 
The equalization effects of transfer systems has been the subject of analyses to 
evaluate the effectiveness of redistribution policies and of the adequacy of 
revenue sharing mechanisms in providing sub national governments with 
adequate resources to undertake their public responsibilities. Achieving vertical 
and horizontal equalization among municipalities is an important issue both for 
long-term growth and financial stability. Reducing horizontal and vertical 
dissimilarities and promoting efficiency and equity is a common objective of the 
systems set up in many countries. In this regard, Portugal is no exception 
having introduced several reforms in the transfer system since the final decades 
of the 20th Century. 
Using panel data for all the municipalities, for the 1997-2010 period, this paper 
tests and evaluates whether there has been an equalization effect in the system 
of transfers to the municipalities. It also tests whether the various regulatory 
changes introduced improved or worsened the equalization effects.  
The use of panel data models permitted the use of a larger number of 
observations, increasing the number of degrees of freedom and decreasing 
collinearity between the explanatory variables as well as a better control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
The results show that on average the municipalities with the highest GDP per 
capita and own revenues per capita receive more transfers per capita, which 
suggests that the system does not contribute to equalization. It is also 
concluded that the successive changes of the system, namely those undertaken 
in 1998 and 2007, were significant in improving the equalization impact of the 
system. 
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ABSTRACT 
The equalization effects of transfer systems has been the subject of analyses to evaluate 
the effectiveness of redistribution policies and of the adequacy of revenue sharing 
mechanisms in providing sub national governments with adequate resources to 
undertake their public responsibilities. Achieving vertical and horizontal equalization 
among municipalities is an important issue both for long-term growth and financial 
stability. Reducing horizontal and vertical dissimilarities and promoting efficiency and 
equity is a common objective of the systems set up in many countries. In this regard, 
Portugal is no exception having introduced several reforms in the transfer system since 
the final decades of the 20th Century. 
Using panel data for all the municipalities, for the 1997-2010 period, this paper tests 
and evaluates whether there has been an equalization effect in the system of transfers to 
the municipalities. It also tests whether the various regulatory changes introduced 
improved or worsened the equalization effects.  
The use of panel data models permitted the use of a larger number of observations, 
increasing the number of degrees of freedom and decreasing collinearity between the 
explanatory variables as well as a better control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
The results show that on average the municipalities with the highest GDP per capita and 
own revenues per capita receive more transfers per capita, which suggests that the 
system does not contribute to equalization. It is also concluded that the successive 
changes of the system, namely those undertaken in 1998 and 2007, were significant in 
improving the equalization impact of the system. 
Keywords: Equalization, Municipalities, Transfers, Panel data methodologies.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The issue of decentralization has attracted the attention of various researchers 
who approach it both on a theoretical and on an empirical perspective. The empirical 
results of the analysis of the effects of transfers from higher to lower levels of 
government shows that there is still much to be explored and much to be done to 
improve existing schemes. Many countries have, in fact, introduced reforms in the way 
they set up transfer formulations, many times influenced by international organizations 
such as  the World Bank and the IMF.  
 Frequently, intergovernmental transfers not only represent a significant source of 
revenue for lower level government recipients but also constitute an important 
component of national public finances. The way transfers are structured and 
implemented impacts on the efficiency and equity of public service delivery of such 
essential functions as education, health, infrastructure and public services in general. 
Fiscal decentralization, transferring expenditure responsibilities to lower levels of 
government might cause efficiency gains and promote regional growth (Fischer and 
Thiesen, 2011). 
In addition, the configuration of fiscal equalization models have shown the 
importance of transfers for long term growth strategies since as countries tend to grow 
disparities seem to persist (Fischer and Thiesen, 2011). 
A transfer system typically seeks to achieve some vertical and horizontal 
equalization to reduce fiscal capacity disparities among jurisdictions of the same level 
and disparities between levels of government. This objective, however, is not always 
achieved which leads to the continuous need to review transfer schemes. 
Intergovernmental transfer schemes require the definition of the resource 
distribution mechanisms. These mechanisms are often based on formulas that consider 
not only local needs and backwardness but also their revenue generating capacity 
frequently assessed by the tax collection potential. 
Formula based transfer schemes have been defended on the basis of their 
transparency and predictability, for both levels of government, and leading to better 
accounting and distribution of available funds (Hofmanet al. 2006). 
In the final quarter of the 20th century, fiscal decentralization in Portugal occurred 
at two levels. On the one hand there was the establishment of two autonomous regions, 
Azores and Madeira, after the 4th revision of the constitution, in 1976. These regions 
were granted political and administrative autonomy with their own governing bodies 
and legislature. On the other hand, municipalities were empowered with considerable 
new responsibilities which led to the need for the review of transfer arrangements. 
 This paper tests various hypotheses about the main characteristics and evolution 
of the Portuguese fiscal transfer system from central to municipal governments. 
Transfers to the regional governments are not considered here. 
 The paper is organized in five sections. After the introduction, the second 
section is devoted to a brief literature review of the issue focusing on the objectives and 
empirical evidence of the equalization effects of the transfer system. A third section 
presents the econometric model used to test the hypotheses of equalization for the full 
period and the impact of various reviews undertaken a long almost two decades.  The 
fourth section presents the statistical results of the tests of equalization effects of the 
Portuguese transfer system to municipalities. The final section is devoted to the analysis 
and review of the main conclusions that can be drawn from the study as well as to the 
identification of limitations and leads for further research.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a literature review of the topic under study. The objective is to 
identify the approaches for testing to what extent the elimination of vertical and 
horizontal disequilibria has been achieved. It is also interesting to list the variables that 
have been used for this purpose. 
Governments are often perceived as performing two important roles: the redistribute 
collected taxes  and; the internalization of fiscal externalities that might occur in 
horizontal relations between various jurisdictions, providing a better supply of public 
goods and incrementing social well being (Riou, 2005). There have been many studies 
that look at decentralization, namely fiscal decentralization, which should be an 
instrument of stabilization (Algoed, 2009), reducing vertical and horizontal disequilibria 
that often exist between sub national jurisdictions due to heir different capacities to 
provide public goods (Widmer and Zweifel, 2010; Blochliger and Charbit, 2008 and 
Gravel and Poitevin, 2006). 
These disequilibria reductions can be achieved through above the average 
contributions for governments with higher than average incomes and below the average 
contributions by governments with lower fiscal capacity. 
The literature refers various possible specific objectives that governments might 
seek such as the elimination of vertical and horizontal differences in order to assure a 
national standard for certain goods and services to guarantee a national standard for 
certain goods and services, to assure the financing of development programs, to correct 
externalities and to strengthen fiscal autonomy (Martinez-Vasquez and Sepulveda, 
2011; Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2007 and Friedrich et al., 2009). 
Smart and Bird (1997) show that in the case of Canada’s fiscal equalization system 
federal transfers were normally associated to higher tax rates in relatively poor regions 
affecting negatively investment competitiveness. The phenomenon is also stressed in 
Widmer and Zweifel (2010). 
Bordingnon et al. (2001) and Baretti et al.(2002) undertook an analysis applied to 
Germany where there are high tax rates to conclude that these high rates had a negative 
impact in performance indicators such as economic growth and fiscal revenues, a result 
also found in Blochliger and Charbit(2008). 
Even though the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis, also cited by Widmer e Zweifel (2010), 
predict a positive relation between fiscal decentralization and government performance, 
due to efficiency improvements, there is also a negative impact, cited in the literature, 
due to fiscal competition between jurisdictions through a set of local, less important, 
taxes applied by local governments (Riou, 2005 and Algoed, 2009) to attract activities 
ad people leading to tax reductions that might be undesirable (Smart, 1998; 
Koethenbuerger, 2006; Eichhorst, 2007; Martinez-Vazquez and Sepulveda, 2011; 
Breuilléet al., 2010 and Gravel and Poitevin, 2006), leading to a significant negative 
impact on revenues (Riou, 2005).  
For Germany, more specifically in Lower Saxony, Egger et al. (2007) tried to 
understand how central government transfers affected local fiscal policy. They 
concluded that an increase in local tax rates led to a decrease in the local tax bases as 
these were transferred to lower tax regions. 
Riou (2005), Algoed (2009) and Blochliger and Charbit, (2008) also refer this 
transfer effect in their studies. 
Another issue referred in Koethenbuerger (2006), relates to the moment in which 
the transfers from the central government occur. He concludes that when transfers are 
for reimbursement of investments already made they lead to higher expenditure levels  
In a study applied to Ukraine, Thiessen (2004), maintains that a equitable 
redistribution of regional revenues explain why the fiscal equalization system does not 
exhibit adverse effects on growth. On the contrary they find evidence of positive 
contributions to both recipient and donor regions 
Empirical Evidence 
Chaparro et al. (2004) proposed the following model to test the equalization effect 
of a Colombian transfer system.  
TAXTOTit= αi + δt+ β.TRPMit + εit  (1) 
Where TAXTOTit and TRPMit are, respectively, own revenues and transfers per 
capita, while αi and  δt are fixed effects for municipalities and years and β measures the 
impact of transfers received on own revenues. Other control variables were also 
introduced such as population (POP), Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and index of un 
satisfied basic services (NBI), as a measure of local social need and the number of 
attacks by the two main guerrilla groups (FARC e ELN). 
The authors collected and used panel data on 802 municipalities for the period1985-
1999.The estimated value of β was negative and significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that meaning that higher transfers are associated to lower own revenues.  
Fortuna et al. (2005) looked at the equalization effect in Portugal running 
regressions for selected years. The model tested was the following: 
TRSit = α0 + α1ORit + α2GDPit  (2) 
Where TRS represents per capita transfers for each municipality, OR represents per 
capita own revenues, GDP is an indicator of per capita output of each municipality and 
i and t represent municipalities and years, respectively.  
The data used to estimate the model included the selected years of 1991, 1998 and 
2002, comprising 304 municipalities. Panel data methodologies were used even though 
there isn’t a continuum of years. Because of multicollinearity between the two 
explanatory variables the model was also estimated with each one individually. The 
study concluded that, with the selected years, a significant equalization effect could be 
detected. It was also concluded that municipalities of the Azores tended to exhibit 
stronger equalization effects and that the changes introduced in the transfer system in 
1998 and 2002 improved the equalization tendency whereas a change of 1991 did not. 
Hauptmeier (2009), analised the equalization effect in Germany, for 1990-2003, 
excluding smaller municipalities and using a model that stressed the expenditure. They 
conclude that transfers without restrictions have a positive and significant impact on 
local expenditures and that the results obtained suggest the presence of an equalization 
effect. 
Huang and Chen, (2011), in an application to China, also test the presence of 
equalization effects in the Chinese transfer system. They used the following model 
log(GRANTit) = β0 + β1log(GRANTi,t-1) + β2log(NORMit) + β3log(POLITICSit) + εit (3) 
where, GRANTit  is the per capita transfers from the central government, GRANTi,t-
1 is the one period lagged dependent variable, NORMit is a vector of variables 
associated to a normative approach to the problem, POLITICSit  is a vector of political 
factors and εit  is the normal error term. The model was tested for 27 provinces and three 
cities for the 1995-2005 period, bearing in mind that there was a system change in 2002. 
The authors conclude that the system does not equalize on average and that the 2002 
reform did not improve this effect. 
Other studies of the equalization effects include Fischer and Thiessen (2011), in an 
application to France, Freinkman et al.(2009) to Russia and Bravo (2010) to Chile. 
Reviewing the various contributions to the equalization issue one can conclude that 
quite often what seems to be consistent the objectives of giving more transfers to those 
jurisdictions that are less capable of attaining certain standards on their own is not 
because the underlying effects do not correspond to expectations. The findings for 
Portugal and China are some examples among any that can be underlined. 
 
3. THE MODEL 
Having reviewed the literature the model chosen to run the tests of the equalization 
hypotheses was the one proposed in Fortuna et al. (2005), because of its simplicity and 
because it provides a basis of comparison with previous work over the same reality even 
if for different periods and a different database. 
The model used is specified as follows: 
TRSit = β0 + β1PIBit + β2RPit + µi (4) 
where 
TRSit – is per capita transfers from the central to municipality i in period t; 
β0 – is the constant term; 
βj – are coefficients to be estimated, associated to each of the explanatory variables 
used, where, j = 1, 2, 3,…, k 
PIBit – is per capita gross regional product for local government i in period t; e 
RPit – is per capita own revenue of local government i in period t. 
This model was estimated using panel data methodologies (see Chaparroet al., 2004; 
Hauptmeier, 2009  and Huang and Chen, 2011). 
The choice of panel data methodologies is justified not only because of its 
increasing popularity as revealed by the literature but also due to its statistical attributes. 
Panel data models have various advantages over cross section models: they allow 
for the control of heterogeneity of the data; they use more observations increasing the 
degrees of freedom and decreasing collinearity between explanatory variables and; can 
identify and measure effects that are not measurable in cross sections or time series 
alone. 
 To test the model and the hypotheses data was collected for 304 municipalities for 
the 1977-2010 period, amounting to 4256 observations. The main variables were central 
government transfers, own revenues of municipalities and local gross regional product.  
  The depend variable, per capita transfers received each year from the national 
budget, was obtained from the sum of the components of the three financing sources: 
municipal funds, autonomous funds and services and other government transfers4. 
The municipal funds are, in turn divided into the Financial Equilibrium Fund, the 
Social Municipal Fund and a variable 5% share of personal income taxes. 
Own revenues were the sum of own fiscal revenues and other revenues5. 
The gross regional product for each municipality was calculated multiplying the 
national GDP per capita6 for each year by the municipal per capita purchasing power 
index,7 a percentage of the national per capita purchasing power (Fortuna et al., 2005). 
Since the municipal purchasing power index does not exist for 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 
2006, 2008 and 2010, the indicator for these years was calculated to be the arithmetic 
average between the immediate higher and lower values.  The value for 2010 was 
assumed to be equal to that of 2009. 
Three municipalities, Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela, were excluded because they were 
created in 1988, after the beginning of the database period. The municipality of Corvo 
was also excluded because in only has about 400 inhabitants and creates a statistical 
outlier when we consider per capita values. 
                                                 
4Direção Geral das Autarquias Locais. Contas de Gerências dos Municípios de 1997 a 2010. 
5Direção Geral das Autarquias Locais. Contas de Gerências dos Municípios de 1997 a 2010. 
6Instituto Nacional de Estatística. Contas Nacionais Anuais Definitivas de 1997 a 2010. 
7Instituto Nacional de Estatística. Estudo sobre o Poder de Compra Concelhio de 1997, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2005, 2007, e 2009. 
To make all variables comparable they were all divided by the population to obtain 
per capita values for each year (see Fortuna et al., 2005; Eichhorst, 2007; Huang and 
Chen, 2011 and Martinez-Vasquez and Boex, 2001). 
All variables were expressed in 1977 prices.  
Before proceeding to use the database assembled, since it is composed of panel data,   
it was necessary to test for the presence of random or fixed effects using the Hausman 
test which according to Greene (2003) and Wooldridge (2002) verifies if coefficients 
with fixed effects and random effects are systematically different.  
The test is specified as follows: 
H0: Cov (µi, xit) = 0 
H1: Cov (µi, xit) ≠ 0, with  i = 1,…, p 
where xit stand for the explanatory variables of the model  
Under the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, the estimators of the model with 
random effects are consistent and efficient while under the alternative hypothesis, with 
endogeneity, the random effects estimators are not consistent while the fixed effects 
estimators are. 
Multicollinearity is, in turn, another common regression problem when explanatory 
variables are strongly correlated. For this reason correlation coefficients were calculated 
for each pair of explanatory variables. 
Yet another test consisted in the analysis of the individual significance of each 
explanatory variable used in the model. The hypothesis tested was: 
H0: βi = 0 
H1: βi ≠ 0, with i = 1,…, p 
The rule is to reject H0 if p-value ≤ α, where α is the probability of accepting a false 
hypothesis. 
The R² statistic (coefficient of determination) was used to test the overall 
explanatory power of the model. 
Having performed the preliminary tests, regressions were run to test the various 
hypotheses considered. The first is that the coefficient of the regressor gross regional 
product per capita is negative, meaning that the higher the income the lower the 
transfers received. This is the main equalization hypothesis. A variant of this hypothesis 
uses own per capita revenue as a regressor instead of the income indicator. It is, 
similarly, expected that the sign be negative. These two regressors are highly correlated. 
A third hypothesis is that the revision of the transfers law of 1998 had a significant 
impact in the equalization effect. The test consists of looking at the significance of the 
coefficient of a dummy variable that assumes the value zero up to 1998 and one times 
per capita gross regional product or per capita own revenue in the other years. A 
significant effect will change the coefficient. If it is negative the equalization effect is 
strengthened and if it is positive it is weakened. 
A fourth test undertakes the same exercise for the revision of the transfer law 
undertaken in 2007. 
Four other tests were performed using dummy variables. They were designed to 
assess if richer municipalities got less transfers per capita; if poorer municipalities got 
more transfers per capita; if municipalities located in the Azores get more transfers per 
capita; if municipalities located in Madeira get more transfers per capita. 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The Hausman test, as in Greene (2003) and Wooldridge (2002), was used to test 
which model is more adequate, the random effects or the fixed effects. The results were 
inconclusive since the model applied to the data set did not satisfy the asymptotic 
assumptions. 
Consequently , as suggested by Greene (2003), for these cases, the Breusch and 
Pagan test was used. This test is based on the Lagrange multiplier and tests the 
following hypotheses: 
 H0: σu² = 0 
H1: σu² ≠ 0 
 where, σu² is the variance of u assuming that the model can be written as  
TRSit = β0 + β1PIBit + β2RPit + ui + ɛit  (4) 
The test led to the non rejection of the null hypothesis and, therefore to the 
indication that the fixed effects model should be used. 
Given this preliminary test, 18 regressions were selected to test each of the 
hypotheses specified. 
From the regressions that were run we can arrive at robust conclusions. Two 
potential problems should however be referred. 
The first one is associated to the simultaneous use of per capita regional product 
and per capita own revenue. It was, a priori, expected that the two variables would be 
highly correlated, which might imply the presence of multicolinearity. Given that the 
correlation turned out to be 0,6 we end up in a range of  uncertainty. For this reason 
regressions were run with the two regressors separately. 
Another result to stress is the significance of the regressions. They all turned out to 
be significant as evaluated by the Fisher test but all revealed a low coefficient of 
determination, which is common in regressions using panel data. 
Having alerted to these “caveats” we can proceed to present the regression results 
using the fixed effects model. They are presented in table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table1. Results Using the Fixed Effects Model 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table1. Results Using the Fixed Effects Model (cont.) 
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Intercept 46,7494 *** 72,2351 *** 104,4896 *** 129,4168 *** 79,8937 *** 100,5083 *** 132,8878 *** 178,8595 *** 253,4544 *** 260,0582 ***
(10,5547) (10,2334) (9,1219) (9,6814) (10,1932) (9,0155) (9,6615) (6,3340) (3,6579) (3,7292)
Gross Regional Product  per capita (GRPpc) 0,0387 *** 0,0276 *** 0,0317 *** 0,0212 *** 0,0299 *** 0,0341 *** 0,0221 ***
(0,0023) (0,0018) (0,0019) (0,0015) (0,0015) (0,0017) (0,0015)
Own Revenue per capita (Rpc) 0,1237 ** 0,1675 *** 0,0787 *** 0,0649 *** 0,7102 *** 0,2004 *** 0,1067 ***
(0,0574) (0,0566) (0,0249) (0,0186) (0,0427) (0,0242) (0,0187)
DummyLaw1998 108,376 *** 158,7079 *** 53,1707 *** 68,8451 *** 155,6177 *** 52,8821 *** 71,0644 *** 146,7808 *** 93,0992 *** 96,7508 ***
(7,7627) (7,4195) (3,6053) (3,7278) (7,4415) (3,5643) (3,6895) (5,6985) (3,2108) (3,2885)
DummyLaw2007 26,2803 *** 79,7833 *** -9,2472 *** 4,0393 84,5908 *** -7,6046 *** 6,1940 ** 55,3490 *** 13,1377 *** 20,1862 ***
(7,8155) (7,4344) (2,6552) (2,7534) (7,4357) (2,6018) (2,6862) (4,2049) (2,5654) (2,5901)
DummyLaw1998 x GRPpc -0,0082 *** -0,0129 *** -0,0122 ***
(0,0014) (0,0014) (0,0010)
DummyLaw2007 x GRPpc -0,0020 ** -0,0063 *** -0,0085 ***
(0,0010) (0,0010) (0,0008)
DummyLaw1998 x Rpc -0,0097 -0,0151 -0,4398 ***
(0,0498) (0,0508) (0,0356)
DummyLaw2007 x Rpc -0,0701 *** -0,0828 *** -0,1846 ***
(0,0194) (0,0200) (0,0169)
DummyBig xGRPpc -0,0264 *** -0,0313 *** -0,0342 ***
(0,0024) (0,0023) (0,0021)
DummyBig x Rpc 0,0028 -0,1004 *** -0,3046 ***
(0,0352) (0,0346) (0,0334)
DummySmall x GRPpc 0,0276 *** 0,0319 *** 0,0353 ***
(0,0037) (0,0035) (0,0028)
DummySmall x Rpc 0,1162 0,1151 * 0,5186 ***
(0,0723) (0,0655) (0,0555)
DummyAzores x GRPpc -0,0055 0,0013 0,0004
(0,0042) (0,0043) (0,0036)
DummyAzoresx Rpc -0,1393 -0,0264 0,0943
(0,1047) (0,1001) (0,0865)
DummyMadeira xGRPpc -0,0248 *** -0,0059 -0,0167 ***
(0,0046) (0,0049) (0,0033)
DummyMadeira x Rpc 0,0740 -0,3781 *** -0,2321 ***
(0,1171) (0,1237) (0,0836)
R² 0,1373 0,0531 0,1937 0,0969 0,0567 0,1878 0,0964 0,0000 0,2044 0,0079
F 138,24 135,77 135,45 124,04 136,04 140,41 125,81 164,75 128,60 151,91
Significance 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Remark 1: * significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level, *** significant at a 10% level.
Remark 2: figures in bold are significant at a 5% significance level.
Remark 3: The figures in parenthesis are the standard errors
Dependent Variable Per capita transfers from national budget
 The simplest versions of the regressions are those numbered 16 to 18, where we test 
the existence of an equalization effect for the full period, for all municipalities, through 
the coefficients of the regressors per capita gross regional product and per capita own 
revenue.   
For all these cases the coefficients of the explanatory variables are not only positive 
but all significant at the 1% level. This means that, on average, the municipalities with 
higher income and higher own revenue per capita get more transfers on a per capita 
basis.  This leads to the conclusion that in Portugal the transfer system to municipalities 
is not equalizing. 
A second group of hypotheses tries to evaluate whether the 1998 and 2007 changes 
of the transfer system introduced significant changes as far as equalization is concerned. 
To this effect dummy variables were used to test intercept and slope changes. With 
respect to the intercept, it is concluded, through regressions 13 to 14, that there was a 
significant increase in both reviews of the system, with all coefficients significant at the 
1% significance level. Only one regression, 13, produces a coefficient that is only 
Independent variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Intercept 52,3662 *** 186,1988 *** 142,7596 *** 144,6249 *** 260,4702 *** 86,6444 *** 82,9220 *** 303,5287 ***
(10,1838) (6,3944) (9,3579) (9,3444) (3,7272) (8,3618) (8,3691) (3,6512)
Gross Regional Product  per capita (GRPpc) 0,0405 *** 0,0191 *** 0,0199 *** 0,0327 *** 0,0356 ***
(0,0019) (0,0014) (0,0014) (0,0012) (0,0010)
Own Revenue per capita (Rpc) 0,6778 *** 0,0525 *** 0,1012 *** 0,1042 *** 0,3381 ***
(0,0444) (0,0181) (0,0182) (0,0183) (0,0179)
DummyLaw1998 104,2677 *** 136,2479 *** 71,1451 *** 72,7239 *** 96,7001 ***
(7,7083) (5,7909) (3,7212) (3,6844) (3,2910)
DummyLaw2007 29,9565 *** 44,8719 *** 5,3473 * 7,1377 *** 20,2211 ***
(7,7277) (4,2900) (2,7557) (2,6879) (2,5901)
DummyLaw1998 x GRPpc -0,0074 ***
(0,0010)
DummyLaw2007 x GRPpc -0,0039 ***
(0,0008)
DummyLaw1998 x Rpc -0,3680 ***
(0,0364)
DummyLaw2007 x Rpc -0,1538 ***
(0,0169)
DummyBig xGRPpc -0,0273 ***
(0,0022)
DummyBig x Rpc -0,1782 ***
(0,0340)
DummySmall x GRPpc 0,0311 ***
(0,0029)
DummySmall x Rpc 0,4795 ***
(0,0582)
DummyAzores x GRPpc -0,0077 **
(0,0034)
DummyAzoresx Rpc -0,3800 ***
(0,0878)
DummyMadeira xGRPpc -0,0222 ***
(0,0031)
DummyMadeira x Rpc -0,2834 ***
(0,0806)
R² 0,1422 0,0845 0,0912 0,0929 0,0080 0,1692 0,1809 0,0268
F 144,36 135,56 124,27 125,42 152,27 123,99 125,11 124,59
Significance 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Remark 1: * significant at a 1% level, ** significant at a 5% level, *** significant at a 10% level.
Remark 2: figures in bold are significant at a 5% significance level.
Remark 3: The figures in parenthesis are the standard errors
Dependent Variable Per capita transfers from national budget
significant at the 5% significance level. This is a robust conclusion since all regressions 
show results in the same direction of change. 
 The exceptions are only found in regressions 3 and 6 which include other 
formulations of the model. 
The test for changes in the slope coefficients were run in regressions 2, 5 and 11. 
They lead to the conclusion that the changes introduced in 1998 and 2007 improved 
equalization since all coefficients are negative and significant at the 1% significance 
level, with the exception of one, which is insignificant.  
Given that there is a great disparity in the size of municipalities the sample was 
divided in three groups including the biggest 20%, the smallest20% and those in the 
middle. Dummy variables were used to test the differences among groups. The 
reference group consists of the municipalities in the middle consisting of 60% of the 
sample. The dummies captured differences relative to the reference group. 
In all situations where this test was run it was possible to arrive at the conclusion 
that the smaller group receives higher per capita transfers and the bigger municipalities 
receive lower per capita transfers. This leads to the conclusion that the system does give 
more to the smaller municipalities and less to the bigger but is not, on average, 
equalizing.  
A last set of hypotheses tested sought to evaluate if municipalities in Madeira and in 
the Azores got transfers that were, own average different from the rest. Dummy 
variables were, once again, used. The results varied with the regression used and were 
consequently inconclusive.  
Regression 1 tests all the hypotheses jointly and supports the following conclusions: 
- On average, the municipalities with  higher per capita  income or own per capita 
receive higher per capita transfers given that the estimated coefficients are positive and 
significant at the 1% or 5% significance level.  
- The changes introduced in 1998 and 2007 led to a significant increase in the base 
transfers as assessed by the change in the intercept. The coefficients are significant at 
the 1% level for both regressors. Analysing the slope effects they turn out to be negative 
in both changes of the system which suggests that the equalization effect of the system 
has improved in each case. Only one coefficient is not significant at the 1% or 5% level. 
- Using dummy variables which categorize municipalities by size (regional product) 
it is possible to conclude that the poorer ones get more per capita transfers than the 
middle income municipalities. Analyzing the results for the higher income group 
produces inconclusive results given their variability. Only two coefficients were 
significant at the 1% level. 
Lastly, the test of differences of the municipalities of the regions of the Azores and 
Madeira, the conclusion is that for the first there is no significant difference while for 
the second only one coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
It is also possible to compare the results obtained with the data set compiled with 
the results of Fortuna et al. (2005), which used a more limited number of years. For that 
purpose the same regressions were run with the new data, using the 1998 and 2002 
observations. 
Table 2 presents the results and establishes the comparisons.  
Table 2. Estimation Comparison with Fortuna et al. (2005). 
Year Variable 
Fortuna et al. 
(2005) Recalculation 
  Intercept 47,253 362,965 
  (t) (19,2) (19,5) 
  
Own 
Revenue(pc) -0,522 -0,573 
1998 (t) (-5,4) (-5,1) 
  Intercept 62,106 456,377 
  (t) (21,9) (20,8) 
  GRPpc -0,223 -0,026 
  (t) (10,9) (8,7) 
  Intercept 56,36 535,618 
2002 (t) (19,6) (21,7) 
  
Own 
Revenue(pc) -0,561 -0,784 
  (t) (-5,9) (-6,5) 
 
One concludes that there are no significant differences either for the estimated 
coefficients or for the t statistics in both studies. 
The results obtained in both studies confirm the same conclusions for the same 
periods. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The literature on fiscal equalization now includes many contributions of the analysis 
of different systems in use and of their contribution to the final supposed final objective 
of eliminating vertical and horizontal inequalities. 
The literature lays out the main principles for obtaining vertical and horizontal 
equalization but it is not always straight forward what results specific schemes will 
produce. 
The current study meant to analyze how the system adopted in Portugal contributed 
to equalization both in its basic configuration and in the successive alterations that were 
introduced with time. 
It was concluded that the Portuguese system of distribution of funds among 
municipalities is not, on average, equalizing in the sense that the higher the per capita 
income the higher are per capita transfers. This suggests that even though there might 
be cohesion components in the transfer formulas they are not sufficient to, on average, 
produce an equalizing result. However, it is also concluded that the changes introduced 
in the system in 1998 and 2007 led to an improvement of the equalization 
characteristics of the transfer system. 
By dividing the sample according to average per capita income it is concluded that 
poorer 20% do get more transfer son average than the median 60% while the richer 20% 
get less. The effects assessed through regression analysis for the full sample do not 
provide evidence of equalization. 
When testing for the hypothesis that the effects on the municipalities in the two 
autonomous regions – Azores and Madeira – no unequivocal conclusion could be drawn 
since the significance and the sight of the variations were not consistent.  
In conclusion, no equalization effect was found, on average, in the system that 
transfers funds to municipalities in Portugal even though two changes introduced in 
1998 and 2007, contributed to improve its equalization characteristics. 
Some shortcomings of the current study can be associated to the fact that some 
variables, namely local income had to be constructed based on municipal consumption 
indices that only exist for some years. To the extent that these values might diverge 
from the real ones introduces some fragility to the study. 
 Looking forward towards other research possibilities, other formulations of the 
equalization effect might be tested as might the use of other variable or better 
constructed variables. 
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